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TRAIN V. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL:
THE GENESIS OF A NEW ERA OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONSHIPS IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
MICHAEL L. HARDY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A S REQUIRED BY THE 1970 AMENDMENTS to the Federal Clean Air Act,1
the states devised and implemented comprehensive regulatory strat-
egies2 designed to achieve and maintain the national air quality goals
set by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).3 In order to
attain these goals by mid-1975,4 the implementation plans were to impose
limits on the amount of pollutants various categories of sources could
emit and time schedules for compliance with these emission limitations. 5
Recognizing that, in some cases, total compliance might be impos-
sible, unnecessary or unduly burdensome, a number of states adopted
variance procedures enabling them to grant exemptions or deferrals to
individual sources. 6 Initially, the EPA did not consider these mecha-
nisms to be beyond state authority under the Act.7 In 1974, however,
the EPA reversed itself by promulgating regulations disapproving those
portions of each state's strategy authorizing the granting of exemptions
or deferrals once the deadline for attainment of the national air quality
standards had passed.8 Thus, once the "attainment dates" had been
o B.A., John Carroll Univ.; J.D., Univ. of Michigan; Member, Ohio Bar.
Clean Air Act §§ 101 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
2 Clean Air Act § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a) (Supp. 1975).
3 Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (Supp. 1975).
Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1975). This
section provides that the national primary ambient air quality standards are to be
attained "as expeditiously as practicable but ... in no case later than three years
from" the date a state's control strategy obtains federal approval. Thus, in most cases
the attaipment dates were to fall in late spring or early summer, 1975.
5 Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1975). Each plan
was to include "emission limitations, schedules and timetables for compliance with
such limitations, and such other measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and
maintenance of such . . . standard .. "
e E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1712 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-912 (1971);
Acts 1967, ch. 162, § 13 [1967] Iowa G.A. 62 (repealed 1972); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3704.03(H) (Page Supp. 1974); R. I. GEr.N. LAws ANN. § 23-25-15 (1968).
7 See, e.g., 37 Fed. Reg. 10872-73 and 10891 (1972), for the EPA's approval of the
Massachusetts and Rhode Island implementation plans respectively. The issue of
whether states could provide for and exercise such authority were not addressed in the
approvals. Note that in 1973 the EPA amended these approvals to disallow those
portions of the Massachusetts and Rhode Island plans which permitted variances. 40
C.F.R..§§ 52.1131, .2079 (1974).
s 39 Fed. Reg. 34535 (1974). 40 C.F.R. § 52.26 was added which provides that "all
state plans are disapproved to the extent that their enabling authority and regulations
permit the deferral of compliance . . . beyond the statutory attainment dates specified
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reached, each source was to be in full compliance, and the states had
no power to permit source-specific ameliorative relief regardless of the
difficulties imposed in conforming to the regulations.
Just as the deadlines were about to pass in most states, the Supreme
Court, in a seven-to-one decision, held that the Act empowered the states
to grant source-specific exemptions or deferrals even after the national
goals were to have been achieved. 9 The Court concluded that the states
were at liberty to adopt whatever mix of control measures they deemed
best suited to their particular situations and that the use of variances
was a valid method for developing the most practical and desirable means
for achieving and maintaining the national goals.
The sole issue before the Court was one of statutory construction.
In addition to examining the anatomy of the statute itself, the Court
analyzed the entire legislative scheme for the control of air pollution.
The scope of its inquiry was expanded to include the federal-state rela-
tionship under the Act. Unless Congress responds with further amend-
ments, 10 this decision will most probably broaden state authority over air
pollution control. 1
The purpose of this article is to analyze the Supreme Court's decision
and to assess its impact on the federal-state relationship under the Clean
Air Act. In order to understand the implications of the Court's decision,
it is first necessary to examine briefly the federal-state relationship en-
visioned by Congress in the legislative history surrounding the 1970
amendments and then consider the decisions of various courts interpret-
ing that relationship.
I. THE FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE
1970 AMENDMENTS
The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act came at a time of public
clamor for an intensive federal commitment to improving the quality of
the nation's air. They reflected congressional disappointment with the
meager results of earlier efforts obtained through reliance ou the iniative
in the Clean Air Act." The Administrator of the EPA took this action to conform the
EPA regulations to the following decisions: Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. EPA, 494 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
483 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1973); and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
478 F.2d 875 (lst Cir. 1973). In these cases the Natural Resources Defense Council
petitioned for review of the implementation plans of Iowa, New York, Massachusetts,
and Rhode Island.
9 Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., __ U.S. _ 95 S. Ct. 1470 (1975).
10 Committees of both the House and the Senate commenced hearings on amendments
to the Clean Air Act in 1974. Hearings on H.R. 2633 and H.R. 2650 and all other bills
which amend the Clean Air Act Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
25, 26, pts. 1 and 2 (1975); Clean Air Act Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. of Public Works, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 93-H42, pts. 1-4 (1975). See generally Strelow, Reviewing the Clean Air Act,
4 Ecowcy L. Q. 583 (1975).
" See discussion in text accompanying notes 69-91 infra.
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of the states.' 2  It was time to "speed up, expand and intensify the war
against air pollution."'
3
The earliest federal air pollution legislation assigned primary respon-
sibility to the states for setting and enforcing air quality standards within
their jurisdictions. 4 The role of the federal government was limited to
supporting and undertaking research and providing technical assistance
to state and local governments. In 1963, the federal power to abate in-
terstate pollution in certain circumstances was granted.' 5 Certain powers
of enforcement and supervision were alloted the federal government in
1967, however, the legislation essentially preserved the states' prevention
and control functions. Although subject to federal supervision, the states
retained the authority to establish air quality standards and to provide
when and in what manner they were to be attained.' 6 Thus, with each
subsequent enactment Congress slightly increased the power of the fed-
eral government.
By 1970, Congress was forced to recognize that the states were not
effectively utilizing the authority reserved to them under the Act. Only
ten states had approved air quality standards, and not one had endorsed
a plan designed to effectuate the standards. Without such plans enforce-
ment was impossible.' 7  Among the reasons cited for the states' failure
to act aggressively was the fear that local industry might move to more
lenient jurisdictions.1 8  Congress also acknowledged that the procedures
for establishment of pollution standards, organizational difficulties at the
federal level and weak federal enforcement authority contributed to the
problem. 19
Seeking to avoid some of the problems with the existing laws, Con-
gress recast the federal and state roles, greatly increasing federal power
in the 1970 amendments. The states were required to meet federally
mandated air quality standards20 within a statutorily specified period of
time. 21  Although much of the states' authority had been shifted to the
12 S. REP. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st
Cong. 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1970). See generally Note, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970:
A Congressional Cosmetic, 61 GEO. L.J. 153 (1970).
13 H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
14 Act of July 14, 1955, ch. 360, § 1, 69 Stat. 322-23.
'5 Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1, 77 Stat. 392401.
'8 Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 485.
17 See 116 CONC. REC. 32,914 (1970).
IS See Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466 and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 60, pt. 1,
at 210, and pt. 2, at 474 (1970).
19 See Greco, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from
Congress, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 384, 388-90 (1971); Strelow, supra note 10, at
589: "In large measure the federal orientation of the 1970 law arose from the general
recognition that state and local governments had failed acceptable progress towards
cleaner air."
20 Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (Supp. 1975).
11 Clean Air Act § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a) (Supp. 1975). See note 4 supra for
the text of this section. 3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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federal government, the states were by no means completely displaced.
Explicitly reserved to the states was primary responsibility for controlling
emissions at their sources.
22
Thus, the 1970 amendments set up a federal-state partnership charg-
ing the federal government 23 with the responsibility of setting air quality
standards applicable throughout the country, and directing the states to
achieve these standards within their jurisdictions. The amendments dif-
fered fundamentally from earlier federal legislation which had relegated
the federal government to, in practical effect, supervisory participation
only, a role which was dependent upon the initiative of the states.
24
A. The Role of the States in the Accomplishment
of the Federal Goals
The amendments provided the states with no detailed guidelines for
attaining national air quality standards but merely directed the states to
submit to the Administrator of the EPA a plan to-"implement, attain
and maintain" the federally adopted standards within nine months of the
promulgation of such standards by the EPA.25  The implementation
plans were to include "emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for
compliance with such limitations," and such other means necessary to at-
tain and maintain the standards.26 The national primary ambient air
22 Clean Air Act § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a) (Supp. 1975): "Each state shall have
the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area
comprising such state ... "
23 The federal agency charged with the responsibility of setting the national air quality
standards is the EPA. Created pursuant to suggestions of President Nixon's Advisory
Council on Executive Organization, this agency acquired the regulatory authority that
various other federal agencies had under federal air pollution legislation. See generally
McCloskey, Reorganizing the Federal Environmental Effort, 11 DUQUESNE L. REV. 478,
485 (1973).
24 According to one commentator, the purpose of the amendments was more than to
effect a realignment of federal and state roles. The amendments also were to force a
departure from the approach of earlier federal legislation that was thought to have
resulted in the establishment of air pollution standards "commensurate with existing
technology feasibility" to a "policy which forces technology to catch up with the . . .
standards .... .. " Greco, supra note 19, at 391. Supportive of this view are two
statements made by Senator Muskie during Senate debate:
The first responsibility of Congress is not . . . to be limited by what appears to
be technologically infeasible . . . . This may mean that people and industries
will be asked to do what seems impossible. . . . 116 Coyc. REc. 6091 (1970).
[P]redictions of technological infeasibility were not considered sufficient to
compromise the public health. 116 CONc. REC. 20598 (1970).
According to other commentators, Congress also apparently attempted to limit the
influence the mechanisms of the marketplace had on standard-setting. See generally
Netschert, Economic Trade-Offs in Air Pollution Abatement, 1 ENVIRONMEN-rAL AFFAiRS
204 (1971); Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Over-
view, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 429, 459-67 (1971). As discussed infra, severalfederal courts
concurred with these two propositions and, in so doing, essentially undercut the authority
of the states in air pollution control.
25 Clean Air Act § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (Supp. 1975). The EPA did,
however, promulgate extensive regulations to guide the states in devising their imple-
mentation plans. 40 C.F.R. §§ 51 et seq. (1974).
26 Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1975).
[Vol. 24:397
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quality standards27 were to be achieved "as expeditiously as practica-
ble but . . . in no case later than three years from the date of approval of
such plan .. ."28 The Administrator was required to approve imple-
mentation plans meeting the statutory criteria and to promulgate substi-
tutes for those be found deficient.2 9
Although the 1970 amendments shifted the burden of establishing air
quality standards to the federal government, it was generally thought
that they did not usurp a state's right to choose the control tactics to be
utilized as long as its methods would collectively achieve the national
goals in a timely fashion.3 0  The provisions authorizing the states to
formulate implementation plans were thought to be in furtherance of a
congressional recognition that the states should have the opportunity to
accommodate particular situations within their jurisdictions. Yet, be-
cause the states had only nine months in which to complete the difficult
task of devising a comprehensive plan, they were unable to fully exer-
cise their authority under the Act. Rather than developing regulations
responsive to particular economic and social considerations, not only were
the regulations relatively simplistic, but they were often universal in their
application to broad categories of sources, rather than source-specific.3'
A number of states included variance procedures in their implementa-
tion plans so that defects and lack of specificity in the plans caused by
haste in their preparation could be remedied.3 2  According to one com-
27 Actually the 1970 amendments prescribe two ambient air quality standards. The
first standard is that which is necessary to protect the "public health," and is called the
primary ambient air quality standard. The second (and more stringent) standard,
called the "secondary standard," is that which is necessary to protect the "public
welfare." Clean Air Act § 109(a)(1), (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(a)(1), (2) (Supp. 1975).
28 Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1975).
29 Clean Air Act §§ 110(a)(2), (c)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(a)(2) and (c)(1) (Supp.
1975). See generally text accompanying notes 83 through 92, infra for a discussion
of whether the EPA must consider economic reasonableness and technical feasibility
when approving state implementation plans.
10 It was felt that the states would consider local factors such as meteorological conditions,
topographical context, and economic and social demands. See Note, Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970: A Congressional Cosmetic, 61 GEO. L.J. 153, 157 (1970). One
commentator said:
The original theory of state implementation plans was that within certain
guidelines states would be free to choose whatever configuration and combina-
tion of control measures they wanted, as long as they provided for attainment
and maintenance of the primary and secondary standards within the statutory
time limit.
English, State Implementation Plans and Air Quality Enforcement, 4 EcoLocY L.Q.
595, 608 (1975). See also Laughran, The Law and the Corporate Polluter: Flexibility
and Adaption and the Developing Law of the Environment, 23 MERCER L. REV. 571,
583-84 (1972).
31 Ohio, for example, adopted regulations for the control of sulfur dioxide emissions
based on the degree of emission reduction necessary to achieve the national goals in
the worst region in the state. The limitation derived was then to be applied to all
sources in the state, even those located in areas outside of the worst region. This
theoretically could lead to substantial "over-kill" because, as applied to sources outside
the worst region, the degree of reduction mandated by the regulations would exceed
that which would have been necessary to attain the national standards.
32 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1712 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-912
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mentator, an attorney formerly with the EPA, it was thought that the
1970 amendments were not intended to prevent the states from provid-
ing for this ameliorative relief from the requirements of their implenen-
tation plans, including emission limitations, so long as the national goals
would not be jeopardized. 33
B. The Role of the States as Interpreted by the Federal
Courts of Appeals Prior to Train
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged EPA
approval of several implementation plans containing variance proce-
dures. 34  The approved state criteria for obtaining variances were less
stringent than those required for obtaining postponements under the
Act.35  Since the NRDC maintained that the postponement provisions
of the Act provided the exclusive variance procedure, any plan granting
exemptions or deferrals based on less rigorous standards would be con-
trary to the Act and thus should not have been approved. The EPA
took the position that because the Act permitted states to revise their
plans even after EPA approval, 36 variance procedures comparable to those
required by the revision section would be acceptable.
This difference of opinion was not without practical importance to the
states or to major air pollution sources. It reached the broad issue of
whether Congress intended the states to retain any significant degree of
control over the manner in which they attained and maintained the na-
tional standards after their plans had been submitted for federal approval.
Of more immediate importance to the operator of a particular source,
the issue concerned his exposure to citizens' suits37 and federal enforce-
ment procedures, 38 which would be invoked for failure to comply with
(1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.03(1-1) (Page Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 23-25-15 (1968).
33 Lunenberg, Federal-State Interaction under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
14 B.C. INn. & Co-mis. L. REv. 637 (1973).
3 The published approvals did not, however, specifically mention the Variances. E.g.,
37 Fed. Reg. 10872-73 and 10891 (1972). The variances were later disapproved. 40
C.F.R. §§ 52.1131, .2079 (1974).
3 Postponements are devices by which a source can obtain a one year deferral of
compliance with the requirements of an implementation plan. Applications for post-
ponements ,mst be made by the governor of a state prior to the deadline for corn-
pliance and will be granted if (a) good faith efforts to comply have been made, (b)
compliance is technologically possible, (c) interim control measures are possible, and
(d) "'the continued operation of such source is essential to national security or to the
public health or welfare." Clean Air Act § 110(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f)(1) (Supp.
1975).
36 The states may revise their implementation plans subject to EPA approval. The
revisions should be endorsed if the revised plans meet the requirements for approval of
the original plans. Clean Air Act § 110(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3) (Supp. 1975).
17 Any person may bring a civil suit on his own behalf against any party violating an
emission standard or limitation or any EPA or state order pursuant thereto in the ap-
propriate federal district court. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (Supp. 1975).
1s The Administrator of the EPA may issue orders or bring civil actions to enforce
applicable implementation plans. Clean Air Act § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (Supp.
1975).
[\Vol. 24:397
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an implementation plan as initially adopted. If the variances were proper,
the sources obtaining variances pursuant to such plans would be im-
nmne from both. If, however, the NRDC was correct, the only way in
which sources unable to comply with the implementation plans could
avoid citizens' suits and federal enforcement would be by procuring a
postponement. Most sources would not qualify for such relief, and would
thus be without the protection they had hoped for under the state plans.
The first court to consider the issue raised by the challenge of the
NRDC was the First Circuit.39 Relying almost exclusively on its inter-
pretation of legislative history and with little analysis of the statute it-
self, the court concluded that the existence of broad discretion to exempt
polluters from emission limitations and timetables after the date for at-
tainment of the national air quality standards was "inconsistent with the
federal statute" and its stated objectives of imposing and effectively en-
forcing "specific emission standards."40  The court reasoned that "Con-
gressional intent could too easily be frustrated by the existence of open-
ended exceptions. Sources of pollution should either meet the standards
of law, or be closed down."'"
The court held that the stringent postponement provisions were to be
the exclusive mechanism for hardship relief after the attainment dates.42
Prior to those dates, however, state variance procedures were permissible.
According to the court, they constituted "a necessary adjunct to the stat-
utory scheme, which anticipates greater flexibility during the pre-attain-
ment period . ..," so long as full compliance with the emission limita-
tions within the mandatory time period would not be jeopardized
thereby.43 The court supported the distinction between pre and post-
attainment variances by inferring congressional intent, pointing out the
"three year grace period" between the approval of the plan and the at-
tainment date. 44
The First Circuit also concluded that "enforcement" and "abatement"
order procedures,4 5 permitting a state to take into account economic and
3 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973).
40 Id. at 885.
41 Id. at 886. One commentator has concluded that the passages from the legislative
history cited by the First Circuit do not support the inferences drawn by the court.
Note, Variance Procedures Under the Clean Air Act: The Need for Flexibility, 15 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 324, 332-33 (1973).
42 478 F.2d at 886.
11 Id. at 887.
44 Id.
[We doubt that Congress intended altogether to preclude . . . reasonable
state deferral mechanisms during the preliminary period. The provisions for a
three year grace period .. . indicate that Congress did not expect immediate
achievement of the standards. Id.
11 Abatement and enforcement orders permit the states to tailor source-specific control
measures on the basis of economic and technological considerations in the same fashion
authorized by variance procedures. E.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.03(S) (Page
Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 23-25-5(h) (1968). 7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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social factors and technical feasibility when seeking to enforce compli-
ance, like variance procedures, circumvented the provisions of the Act.
4 6
Approximately three months later, the Eighth Circuit adopted the First
Circuit's analysis and reversed the Administrator's approval of the Iowa
provisions for variance and abatement orders4 allowing consideration
of economic and technological factors after the attainment date had
passed .4
In early 1974, the Fifth Circuit had occasion to review the Admin-
istrator's approval of those portions of the Georgia implementation
plan49 which allowed Georgia officials to grant variances and directed
them to take into account economic impact and technological feasibility
in the discharge of their duties. In a lengthy opinion reviewing the
Act and its legislative history, the court concluded that variance provi-
sions and the statutory authority directing consideration of economic
and technological feasibility were improper.
50
The court's holding, however, went far beyond the decisions of the
First and Eighth Circuits because it also concluded that authority to issue
variances prior to the attainment date was inconsistent with the Act.5'
The court reasoned that the stringent postponement provisions pre-
empted state variance procedures:
In a statute that constituted a "challenge to do what seem[ed]
impossible", seeking to "forc[e] technology to catch up with the
newly promulgated standards", it was essential to include a de-
vice to ensure that ambitious commitments made at the planning
stage could not readily be abandoned when the time came to
meet those commitments, and to assume the costs and burdens
they entail.52
Believing that Congress sought to compel unwaivering commitments
to enforcement of the strict controls necessary to achieve clean air, the
court concluded that Congress intended to make departures from imple-
mentation plans unusual and difficult to obtain. The court considered
Congress' imposition of rigorous substantive and procedural prerequisites
for postponements such as requiring that applications be made by the
governor and limiting their applicability to situations where the means for
compliance were unavailable and continued operation of the source was
41 478 F.2d at 889.
During the post-attainment period, the Rhode Island Director must be guided
by the objective requirements of the state's implementation plan. He may not
exercise discretion based on economic and social factors and notions of technical
feasibility. Id.
47 Acts 1967, ch. 162, § 13 [1967] Iowa G.A. 62 (repealed 1972).
41 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1973).
41 GA. CODE ANN. § 88-912 (1971).
50 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd
and remanded sub nom., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., __ U.S.
95 S. Ct. 1470 (1975).
5' Id.
52 Id. at 401.
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essential to national security." Any state procedure less stringent than
the postponement provisions, according to the court, would frustrate the
purpose of the 1970 amendments and was therefore invalid.
A month after the Fifth Circuit rendered its opinion, the Second Cir-
cuit adopted the distinction between pre and post-attainment variances
set forth in the holdings of the First and Eighth Circuits and partially
rejected the holding of the Fifth Circuit.54 Shortly thereafter, the EPA
acceded to these holdings and promulgated regulations that adopted
the pre and post-attainment distinction created by the First Circuit, and
utilized a portion of the Fifth Circuit's decision disallowing consideration
of availability of technology, source hardship or economic burden as a
basis for providing a compliance date postponement beyond the attain-
ment date.5 5 According to the EPA:
The new language has been added as a means of discouraging
source-initiated state court litigation over the reasonableness of
enforcement orders . . .without such qualifying language, it is
feared that some sources might choose to litigate properly con-
structed compliance schedules . . . on the grounds that a
later compliance date is warranted because of hardship, eco-
nomic burden, or technological difficulties.5 6
Almost two months after the EPA had promulgated these regulations,
the NRDC (and the EPA) suffered defeat. The Ninth Circuit rejected
the First Circuit's distinction between pre and post-attainment variances,
and concluded that the relevant distinction is the impact of the variance
on the attainment and maintenance of the national air quality stan-
dards.57 If the variance would not prevent the timely attainment or sub-
sequent maintenance of the national air quality standards, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned, it was permissible both before and after the attainment
date.58  After reviewing the legislative history the court concluded that
Congress meant to allow consideration of economic and technological
feasibility when the attainment of the national standards by the deadline
would not be threatened. States were not to be totally committed to
their initial plans "without any flexibility whatsoever." 59  The court also
53 Id. at 402.
5 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519, 523 (2d Cir. 1974).
s 39 Fed. Reg. 34533 (1975). These regulations amend portions of 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.11
et seq. and 52.20 et seq.
56 39 Fed. Reg. 34534 (1974).
17 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974).
m Id. at 912-13.
51 Id. at 913-14.
As long as a possible variance from a state plan will not preclude the attainment
or maintenance of such standards, we discern no legislative intent to commit
a state, in toto, to its initial plan, without any flexibility whatsoever. We do not
believe .. . that the Act forestalls consideration of economic and technological
feasibility when a variance that will not interfere with national ambient air
quality standards is contemplated. Id.
1975]
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
pointed out that no variances would be effective until sanctioned by the
EPA.6 0
III. STATE FLEXIBILITY AFTER THE ATrAINMENT DATES
As a result of the decisions of the First, Eighth, Fifth, and Second
Circuits, and the EPA regulations conforming to them, no state had
authority to revise the substantive content of its implementation plan for
any individual source after the attainment dates had been reached.
Such revisions were available only for actions tantamount to changes in
generally applicable requirements. 6' Thus, even if a state were to dis-
cover, after it had promulgated its implementation plan, that a require-
ment of its plan was unnecessary or unreasonable in its application to
a particular source, it was nevertheless required to compel compliance
therewith, regardless of the economic and social burdens imposed on the
source. If the source were a power plant, the state could do nothing to
alleviate the burden the rate-payers would be required to bear; or, if the
source were a marginally profitable industrial operation, the state could
not take action to protect the employees from the possibility of a shut-
down.
Had the states been permitted to grant source-specific relief taking
into account facts such as economic impact or local hardship, and had
such actions been treated as effective revisions of their plans, the states
would have been able to improve upon decisions reached as a result of
the time pressure under which they developed the original plans. Since,
the states could not revise their plans for the benefit of specific sources
and accordingly lacked the authority to insulate sources from citizens'
suits and federal enforcement, the arena for such policy decisions became
the federal courts or the regional offices of the EPA.
IV. THE FEDERAL ROLE AFTER THE ATTAINMENT DATES
Recognizing that there would be a large number of sources unable to
achieve compliance by the mid-1975 deadlines and that few states in-
tended to seek postponements to obtain temporary relief for these sources,
the EPA announced that it would utilize its enforcement authority to se-
cure compliance. 6 The EPA did not, however, want to assume exclusive
authority or responsibility for assuring that sources achieve compliance
60 Id. at 915. See also Metropolitan Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511
F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
61 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 401 (5th Cir. 1974) rev'd
and remanded sub nom., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., - U.S.
95 S. Ct. 1470 (1975).
12 40 Fed. Reg. 14876 (1975).
[The enforcement authority] is not intended to discredit use of the . . . post-
ponement procedure for obtaining post deadline compliance date extensions
.... By contrast the stated purpose of these regulations is not to provide plan
protection to sources in violation, but rather to assure that such sources achieve
compliance, albeit after the deadlines have passed. Id.
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after the attainment dates had passed. Therefore, the EPA promulgated
proposed regulations to guide the states in their enforcement efforts.
The proposed regulations
delineate specifically what EPA considers to be effective en-
forcement after a deadline, so that any state will know whether
the action it is taking would be consistent with that which the
Administrator would take in the same situation, and so that the
source may gain some assurance that its conscientious compli-
ance efforts, in response to a State issued enforcement order,
will be relatively free from federal challenge.
63
The proposed regulations require the EPA to issue post-attainment
date enforcement schedules64 after affording the public the opportunity
to comment thereon. 65 These timetables should mandate compliance
"as expeditiously as practicable," 66 setting forth appropriate increments
of progress67 and suitable interim control measures.6"
If a state were to establish programs conforming to the EPA's pro-
posed rules, it would be able to do what the decisions of the First,
Eighth, Fifth and Second Circuits said was impossible - that is, to grant
extensions to almost any source without meeting the rigid requirements of
the postponement provisions. Such procedures, however, would not insu-
late the source from citizens' suits, as the postponement provisions
would, but perhaps would assure that source some freedom from inde-
pendent federal action.
V. THE VALIDITY OF STATE VARIANCE IECHANISNIS AS INTERPRETED
BY THE SUPREME COURT
Differing with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that states lacked author-
ity to issue pre-attainment date variances for individual source relief ex-
cept through the stringent and generally difficult-to-obtain postponement
provisions, the EPA prosecuted an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.69  In view of the EPA's adoption of regulations precluding
post-attainment date variances, the scope of the EPA's appeal "on its
facts . . . [was] . . . limited to the validity of the Georgia variance pro-
vision insofar as it authorized variance before Georgia's attainment date,
which . . . [was] ... in July, 1975. "70
The Court, however, did not confine its inquiry or its holding to the
limited question presented. It pointed out that
63 Id.
64 40 Fed. Reg. 14881 (1975). (Proposed 40 C.F.R. § 65.3.)
65 Id. (Proposed 40 C.F.R. § 65.4.)
66 Id. (Proposed 40 C.F.R. § 65.3(a)(1).)
67 Id. (Proposed 40 C.F.R. § 65.3(a)(2).)
6 Id. (Proposed 40 C.F.R. § 65.3(a)(3).)
' Train v. Natural Resources )efense Council, Inc., - U.S. - 95 S. Ct. 1470 (1975).
70 Id. at - 95 S. Ct. at 1479.
1975]
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[t]he Agency nonetheless has not abandoned its original view
that the revision section authorizes variances which do not in-
terfere with the attainment or maintenance of national ambient
air standards. Moreover, the Agency is candid in admitting that
should we base our decision on its interpretation of [the revision
section], the decision would support the approval of the imple-
mentation plans which would provide for variances effective
after the attainment date.7'
After extensively analyzing the language of the 1970 amendments
and carefully examining legislative history, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that postponements were
the exclusive means by which individual sources could obtain relief from
state implementation plans.
Without going so far as to hold that the Agency's construction
of the Act was the only one it permissibly could have adopted,
we conclude that it was at the very least sufficiently reasonable
that it should have been accepted by the reviewing courts. 72
A fair reading of this language would indicate that the Court did not
disapprove, as a matter of law, the construction of the various circuits.
It seemed merely to hold that the circuits erred when they substituted
their interpretation of the Act for the reasonable one of the EPA. Thus,
on its face, the Court's holding rested on the basic canon of adminis-
trative law that a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment con-
cerning an interpretation of a statute for that of an agency charged with
its administration if the agency's interpretation is sufficiently reasonable.
A reading of the opinion as a whole suggests, however, that this was
not the basis of the decision. As the Court admitted, the issue of statu-
tory construction
reaches the broader issue whether Congress intended the states
to retain any significant degree of control of the manner in
which they attain and maintain the national standards. .... 13
The Court defined state authority under the Act to include use of the
revision mechanism to grant source-specific variances
which do not compromise the basic statutory mandate that,
with carefully circumscribed exceptions, the national primary
ambient air standards be attained in not more than three years,
and maintained thereafter.7 1
Postponements were distinguished from revisions. Whereas revisions do
not affect the achievement of the national goals, 75 postponements are a
71 Id.
712 Id. at - 95 S. Ct. at 1479-80.
13 Id. at . 95 S. Ct. at 1481.
74 Id. at _ 95 S. Ct. at 1491.
75 Id.
[Vol. 24:397
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss3/3
1975] TRAIN v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 409
"safety valve by which may be accorded, under certain carefully specified
circumstances, exceptions to the national standards themselves." 76
The form of the source-specific relief, suggested the Court, need not
be limited to deferrals or modifications. Outright exemptions seem to be
equally valid. 77 The controlling criterion is whether the variance will af-
fect attainment and maintenance of the national goals. 78  No state vari-
ance action, however, is self-executing. It must be submitted to and ap-
proved by the EPA, subject to the same general requirements applicable
to the original implementation plans.79 Thus, the EPA is relegated to a
secondary role in the process of determining and enforcing the specific,
source-by-source emission limitations necessary to the achievement
of the national standards.
Therefore, according to the Court, the states did in fact retain a great
deal of flexibility to "fine-tune" their implementation plans in their spe-
cific application to individual sources, with the only limitation being
that such "fine-tuning" not compromise the timely attainment and sub-
sequent maintenance of the national primary standards. Accordingly,
the states could refine their control programs in response to local situa-
tions in a way and at a level of specificity that was realistically unavail-
able to them when they had to rush to meet the nine month deadline
for submission of the plans.
In sum, as a result of the Court's decision, the states retain authority
to grant source-specific variances from their federally approved imple-
mentation plans, both before and after their specified attainment dates,
so long as the variances do not jeopardize the timely attainment of the
pertinent national standards or interfere with their subsequent main-
tenance.8 0  Until the variance is granted by the state and federally ap-
proved as a plan revision the source must comply with the requirements
of the implementation plan and is exposed to citizens' suits and federal
enforcement proceedings seeking compliance with the plan. If the re-
quisites for a variance cannot be met the state can only apply to the EPA
for a one year deferral of the date by which total compliance is required of
a particular source."' During the pendency of these postponements, the
11 Id. at - 95 S. Ct. at 1482.
7 Ido at - 95 S. Ct. at 1486-87. "In the implementation plan context, normal usage
would suggest that . . .a revision is a change in a plan which deletes or modifies the
requirement." Id.
78 Id.
19 Id. at - 95 S. Ct. at 1482.
s0 The EPA has published notice of an interim variance policy that will conform existing
regulations to the Court's holding in Train. 40 Fed. Reg. 22587 (1975). Variances
will be granted only in clear cases upon the state's submission of
current ambient data and a modeling calculation designed to show that the
individual source involved will not interfere with attainment of the pertinent
national ambient air quality standard by its attainment date in the appropriate
air quality control region . . . [and that] . . . during the period of the variance
the source will not interfere with maintenance of such standard. Id.
81 The issue of whether more than one postponement can be granted to a particular
source has not yet been decided. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
- U.S. - 95 S. Ct. 1470, 1485 n.21 (1975). 13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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source would be free from the possibility of citizens' suits and federal en-
forcement actions. If, however, a source could not satisfy the stringent
criteria of the postponement provisions and could not establish its quali-
fications for a variance, then it would be subject to the proposed federal
enforcement policy, including final compliance with the substantive con-
tents of the implementation plan as expeditiously as practicable, appro-
priate increments of progress, interim control measures, and possibly,
punitive sanctions.
s2
A. Ramifications of the Court's Decision
The Train decision may be an important indicator of how the Supreme
Court will eventually resolve the conflict among the circuits regarding
whether economic and technological features should be considered when
a state implementation plan is approved. S3  The Administrator has
claimed, in several cases, that he need not take into account these con-
siderations with regard to specific sources when evaluating state plans.
The Third and Fourth Circuits have held otherwise. 4 Two other circuits
have noted that these considerations are more appropriately left to, or
may be raised in, enforcement proceedings. 8 The Eighth Circuit has
gone so far as to state that the Administrator is precluded from disap-
proving plans on the basis of economic unreasonableness or technological
infeasibility;16 such factors are political questions to be weighed by the
states when determining the control measures to be used.8 7 In the
Eighth Circuit's opinion, the EPA is limited to deciding whether the
chosen control measures will meet the national standards by the dead-
82 40 Fed. Reg. 14881 (1975). (Proposed 40 C.F.R. § 65.3.)
83 Judicial review of the Administrator's approval of state implementation plans may be
had pursuant to the Clean Air Act, § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (Supp. 1975).
'4 Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, No. 72-542 (3d Cir., Aug. 21, 1975); St. Joe Minerals Corp.
v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th
Cir. 1973).
85 Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975); Buckeye Power,
Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973).
86 See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 215-16 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W.
3178 (Oct. 7, 1975).
It is clear that Congress intended to preclude economic and technological
factors from the Administrator's consideration of whether to approve an im-
plementation plan. Even if these grounds are considered by the Administrator,
the mandatory and directory language of [§ 1857c-5(a)(2)] would preclude using
such grounds as a basis for setting aside his action on a petition for review
• . . [of his approval].
As each state was free, within the federal standards, to adopt its own plan for
meeting the challenge of reducing air pollution, it is appropriate that the deci-
sions as to what would be required in terms of economic cost and technological
innovation were left to the states. These decisions were left by the Congress to
the states and are not to be reviewed by means of a . . . [petition for review of
the approval].
87 Id. at 219.
It is not our role to sit as a super-legislature balancing the necessity of com-
pliance with the clean air standards against competing economic and technologi-
cal considerations. Id.
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line.88  The Supreme Court in Train did not have the same question
before it as did the circuits, and thus, its position may be unclear as to
whether a source can seek to compel a state to exercise its discretion
and grant relief. Yet in view of the Court's strong language relative to
the states' broad discretion and the EPA's limited standards, it may well
be that the Supreme Court would hold that air pollution sources do not
have recourse to the EPA and the courts if a state chooses not to grant
the ameliorative relief requested. 9
For air pollution sources, however, this judicial affirmance of the
states' significant policymaking role in air pollution control may well
represent a tw,o-edged sword. On one hand, the states have flexibility to
tailor source-specific ameliorative relief. On the other, if a state chooses
not to exercise this discretion, the source may have no recourse to the
EPA or to the federal courts to compel the granting of such relief.
If a source cannot convince the appropriate state to make a revision
of its plan, and if the implementation plan has been federally approved,
the only avenue for relief would appear to be review in the federal courts
of appeals on any grounds arising after the expiration of the time for re-
view of the initial implementation plan's approval. 90 Whether such relief
is available for reasons of technological infeasibility or economic unrea-
sonableness is not firmly established, for the same reasons discussed
above with respect to the split in circuits relative to the considerations for
approval of an implementation plan. The Eighth Circuit, the only cir-
cuit to have this specific section before it, believes that such relief is
available only upon discovery of new information relating to the protec-
tion of health and welfare, and
not to new information relating to technological innovation or
lack thereof, or to cost increases not forseen at the time of the
Administrator's approval of the implementation plan and thus
not asserted in a petition for review within 30 days.9'
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision may well mark the beginning of a new
era of federal-state relationships, defining for the states a greater flexi-
bility, free of federal interference, in devising and developing their policy
"s It should be noted that the measures chosen by the states must include those types of
controls enumerated in the Act. In Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, Nos. 74-2015 and
74-2020 (6th Cir., Sept. 4, 1975), the court upheld the Administrator's disapproval of the
Kentucky implementation plan which utilized alternate control strategies rather than
emission limitations.
" The Supreme Court will decide this issue in Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th
Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3178 (Oct. 7, 1975).
" Clean Air Act § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (Supp. 1975). According to the
Eighth Circuit, the filing of the petition should be preceded by a demand on the
Administrator and his failure to act on said demand. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515
F.2d 206, 220 (8th Cir. 1975).
91 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 219 (8th Cir. 1975) cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W.
3178 (Oct. 7, 1975). 15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
choices as to the means of achieving within their jurisdictions the attain-
ment and maintenance of the national air quality goals. This decision
should represent a good working solution to the problem that has resulted
from the emphasis on federal activity under the 1970 amendments -
that is, how to achieve optimum interaction among the various levels of
government so that each plays an important role in controlling air
pollution. As one commentator has perceived, state and local officials
have begun to resist the expansion of the EPA into the role that was
thought left to the states, the control of air pollution at its sources in a
way that is responsive to local needs and circumstances.
A number of state and local officials . . . feel that the Clean
Air Act has created too great a federal "big brother" phenomenon
and that communities should be given more latitude to decide
how and when to achieve more broadly stated federal goals.
There is a growing recognition that if regulations impacting
heavily on people's lifestyles are developed far away from the
"grass roots," the public will neither support nor accept
them.92
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision reverses a trend, commencing
with the early circuit decisions, that tended to centralize policy roles in
the Federal EPA. But in affirming great latitude in the states in the se-
lection of the means for the control of air pollution and in relegating the
federal government to a secondary role as to the selection of those means,
the Court may have effectively limited air pollution sources to the states
for relief, without any basis for appeal to the EPA or to the federal
courts if the states choose not to exercise the great latitude they now have
to refine their control measures in their specific application.
92 Strelow, supra note 10, at 391.
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